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ABSTRACT
LESSONS LEARNED FROM EPA’S CLIMATE LEADERS PROGRAM:
AN EVALUATION TO FORTIFY VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES
Author: Vivian Futran
Advisor: Elaine Wright
A voluntary environmental program (VEP) called Climate Leaders was recently
cancelled by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). To find out why and gather
lessons learned, the program was examined using a three-pronged approach: 1) a metaanalysis of program evaluation theory literature, 2) a review of guides and external reports on
Climate Leaders, and 3) interviews with former program participants and implementers.
Findings reveal that environmental protection is best achieved by combining regulation with
voluntary methods as they complement and buttress each other. Recommendations were
compiled to help future VEPs minimize wasted resources and improve environmental
conditions. These recommendations were vetted by industry, and ultimately contribute to a
comprehensive “guiding framework” for the design, implementation, and evaluation of
VEPs. Existing VEP models and evaluative tools still lack the perspective of several key
disciplines, so additional program evaluations are necessary to capture all of the primary
characteristics correlated with program success and complete the guiding framework.
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CHAPTER ONE
Overview
Problem Statement
The United States Environmental Protection Agency has carried out many federal
voluntary environmental programs (VEPs). These are often canceled for reasons ranging
from poor execution to a change in the administration’s budget or political priorities. Even
strong programs that are deficient in just one area or are unexpectedly terminated can hurt the
reputation of VEPs, thus weakening an important tool for environmental protection. This
leads to loss of resources invested by implementers and partners, highlighting the need for a
tool to comprehensively asses all stages of a program’s lifespan including design,
implementation, and evaluation (Arora, 1995). Since voluntary programs represent a
relatively new style of environmental governance, little progress has been made on VEPs in
Environmental Program Evaluation research (Knaap, 1998).
Need for Research
The field of Environmental Program Evaluation is growing, but existing models for
creating strong VEPs are not comprehensive. A guiding framework that captures the diverse
program characteristics known to correlate with success is needed. It must cover the
program from its initiation to its end, and accommodate the needs of government, business,
and environment (Boyd, 2011). It must also be a synthesis of existing program design and
assessment tools drawn from several disciplines. While completing a fully comprehensive
framework is outside the scope of this project, the research and evaluation conducted here are
steps in this direction. They should serve as a foundation for future research. Additional
VEP evaluations from fields including public policy, political science, management,
business, and economics will also be needed.
[3]

Purpose of Study
This study was intended to help compile characteristics for the ideal voluntary
environmental program by evaluating a recently terminated voluntary environmental
program called Climate Leaders. Successful strategies that could be applied to other ongoing
and future programs were captured, as well as characteristics and trajectories to be avoided.
In the short-term, these “lessons learned” will improve the performance of EPA’s ongoing
and future voluntary environmental programs. In the long-term, they will help advance a
guiding framework for designing, steering and evaluating voluntary environmental programs.
It might even prove relevant to VEP bundling schemes which group together voluntary
environmental programs for easy access at the federal and regional level, like the
Sustainability Partnership of EPA’s Region 3 (Mid-Atlantic) Office in Philadelphia.
Research Questions
The research questions being investigated are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

How do you define success for the Climate Leaders program?
In what ways did Climate Leaders succeed?
How could Climate Leaders have been improved?
What circumstantial conditions (e.g. political, economic) are important to the
success/failure of VEPs?
5. What inbuilt features (e.g. structural, procedural) are important to the success/failure
of VEPs?
6. What lessons learned from Climate Leaders can be applied to ongoing EPA VEPs on
a federal and regional level?
7. What improvements are not accounted for in existing frameworks that must be added
for comprehensibility in evaluating program performance?
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Definition of Terms
Program
Program here is defined as “a set of staff activities with a defined goal or purpose.”
The Government Performance and Results Act terms these as “activities” to achieve goals
and objectives (Pumphrey, 1993).
Public Voluntary Program
A public voluntary program (henceforth referred to as a “voluntary program”) is an
initiative or event that seeks to achieve a goal by means of willful participation. It is a
collaborative, non-regulatory approach most clearly characterized by what it is not: a
mandatory program (Boyd & Manson, 2011). Voluntary programs are organized and
implemented by an individual or group. As long as implementation faculties persist they can
exist even without active participation, however they will not have a purpose without the
involvement of participants. One subset within this category of program is specifically
dedicated to environmental stewardship. “Voluntary environmental programs (VEPs) seek to
improve the environment by encouraging, rather than mandating, businesses and other
organizations to adopt environmentally protective measures” (Borck, 2009).
A voluntary program involves activity over a span of time, and stops existing when it
ceases to be implemented. A voluntary agreement is fundamentally different because it is
initiated by a one-time action: two (or more) parties sealing their commitment. This can be a
handshake, signature, or anything else that constitutes a willful acceptance of mutually
agreed upon terms. An agreement stops existing when it expires or when the parties involved
revoke their commitment. A voluntary program can include a voluntary agreement by
members, but a voluntary agreement does not imply the existence of a program.
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Voluntary Environmental Program (VEP)
Voluntary environmental programs consist of programs, codes, agreements or
commitments. They encourage private, public, or nonprofit organizations to voluntarily
reduce their environmental impacts beyond the requirements established by environmental
regulations (Darnall, 2005: Carmin et al., 2003).
VEP Guiding Framework
A comprehensive plan for the design and implementation of a voluntary program,
tailored to address the special goals, needs, and scope of the environmental issue being
addressed. It must guide program staff throughout the life of the program from conception to
termination. It must also include all of the characteristics of performance and structure
necessary for success and satisfaction by both implementers and participants.
Evaluation
The term evaluation describes different models or data collection strategies to gather
information at different stages in the life of a project in a systematic investigation of worth or
merit (Westat, 2002). The product is an assessment of the results, impact, or effects of a
program or policy (Pumphrey, 1993). Evaluations have several distinguishing characteristics
relating to focus, methodology, and function. An evaluation: 1) assesses the effectiveness of
an ongoing program in achieving its objectives, 2) relies on the standards of project design to
distinguish a program's effects from those of other forces, and 3) aims at program
improvement through a modification of current operations (EPA Evaluation Glossary, 2010).
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CHAPTER TWO
Research Design & Methodology
The primary objective of this research is to compose recommendations to improve
future VEPs using the Climate Leaders Program as a case study. Ultimately this will
contribute to a comprehensive guiding framework for voluntary environmental programs.
There were three main steps involved in this undertaking. (See Appendix C, Chart 1 for the
Three-Pronged Approach). The first was synthesizing and summarizing existing literature
from evaluation theory. The second was reviewing publications on Climate Leaders to
provide context. The third was assessing the Climate Leaders program through interviews.
(See Appendix A, Table 1 for a Summary of Data Collection Methods).
Evaluation Literature Review
This study began with a meta-analysis of existing literature on program assessment
standards. It focused on evaluative standards for programs that resemble Climate Leaders in
goal and scope. The analysis included surveying existing evaluation methods from
organizational literature, including the resources on the EPA Evaluation Support website
(EPA, 2011). Next was researching scholarly journal articles (in the Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, the Annual Review of Environment &
Resources, etc.) as well as publications and guidelines by EPA and other relevant
organizations. By cross-referencing existing lists of criteria for successful environmental
programs, especially those focused on voluntary ones, a list of VEP evaluation standards was
created against which to compare the components and operations of Climate Leaders
retrospectively.
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Climate Leaders Interviews
Information about Climate Leaders was gathered in order to assess the program based
on the evaluation literature reviewed. This entailed searching EPA websites, publications,
articles, and conducting interviews with former EPA program implementers (EPA
employees) and “partners” (participating organizations and businesses). (See Appendix C,
Chart 2 for Three Steps to Climate Leaders Evaluation).
Interviewees
All interviewees were offered full anonymity (or alternatively, select attribution) to
encourage candor. They were told that the information gathered would be presented in an
aggregate form, without specific attribution or quotations unless explicit permission was
given. Each was given background on the purpose of the study: to evaluate Climate Leaders
for the improvement of ongoing and future EPA programs, and contribute to the development
of a guiding framework for VEPs. Their incentive to participate was the opportunity to help
improve VEPs from EPA and other organizations which would benefit the environment in
the long-run. Interviewees were also offered a copy of the final project report.
Interviews with program implementers fell into two categories. First were EPA staff
from headquarters in DC who had most control over the recently terminated Climate Leaders
program, who provided insight into the intended structure and process behind the VEP. For
additional perspective, interviews were also conducted with members of the EPA office in
Philadelphia. This Regional office had decided independently to promote Climate Leaders at
a more local level. They provided a viewpoint from the “inside,” but theoretically with less
ownership bias.
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Interviews with program participants offered a complementary point of view,
addressing how program intention was translated into action. Questions addressed what
value was gained from involvement, if any. These two interview groups (former partners and
EPA implementers) were chosen because they were most knowledgeable about the process
and results of Climate Leaders. They invested more time in dealing directly with the VEP
than did the designers or more senior agency Directors.
A total of thirteen formal interviews were conducted, each addressing all of the
standardized interview questions. These played a fundamental role in this study because they
helped define success for the Climate Leaders program. Of the formal interviews, four were
with EPA employees, two of which had worked on the program full time. The other two had
helped advertise and recruit for Climate Leaders through a Regional level voluntary program
“bundle.” The remaining nine interviewees were representatives from former Climate
Leader partners, all of whom had engaged directly with the program as part of their
company’s “climate,” “air,” “environmental,” or “sustainability” team. Of the partner
interviewees, two were representatives of smaller businesses and seven were from large wellknown companies. This category included one interviewee who had previously worked at
EPA and helped design the program, providing a unique perspective that straddled both
partner and implementer. (See Appendix C, Chart 3 for Formal Interviews Breakdown).
Other initial informational “interviews” that did not adhere to the same standard of
consistency were included for context or background, but not in the interview analysis
portion of this project. These will be referred to as “personal communications” from now on,
and will not be included in further references to interviews.
Interview Questions
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In each interview, eleven core questions were asked. These were posed to all
interviewees, while follow-ups for clarifications varied depending on the thoroughness of the
initial response. The interview questions for participants and EPA employees differed only
slightly, and these variations are included with the questions in parenthesis where applicable.
The core questions from the interview script can be found in the Instrumentation section
below.
The interview questions were meant to find out how Climate Leaders functioned in
practice, and went deeper than published descriptions of the program’s theoretical design as
envisioned by EPA. The interviewees illuminate how these programs actually performed, so
that true faults—especially procedural ones—could come to light. Without these interviews,
official analysis and published commentary would have to be taken at face value despite
possible prejudice.
Interview Bias and Error
A major strength of this research was the objectivity of analysis; it was not authored
by an EPA affiliate or former partner. However, while there was no prejudice on the part of
the researcher, there were a few areas of potential error inherent in the study due to time and
resource constraints.
First, constraints on time and finances limited the number of interviews to the point
that statistical trends could not be extracted. It was not possible to interview a random
sample of Climate Leader implementers and participants, as only those parties that responded
to email solicitation were interviewed and included in analysis. Thus the sample was
somewhat self-selected. This can lead to sampling error: the probability that if another
sample of the same size were drawn, different results might be obtained (Sudman, 1976). It
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was also not possible to conduct enough interviews to achieve statistical significance due to
time and financial constraints.
Second, while it is true that larger samples would have reduced sampling error,
sampling error is the smallest of the three components of error that affect the soundness of
sample designs (Westat, 2002). Two other errors—sample bias (primarily due to loss of
sample units) and response bias (responses or observations that do not reflect “true”
behavior, characteristics or attitudes)—are more likely to jeopardize validity of findings
(Westat, 2002).
There were two main forms of sample bias present. One was that the partners that
accepted the invitation to be interviewed were mostly big, profitable organizations with a
culture of prioritizing environmental performance. The respondent characteristics were also
skewed towards those that had the resources dedicated to an environmental representative or
team. Since these representatives are active in the larger environmental activities of industry
and business, they had distributed their contact information at conferences and other
environmental events making them easier to track down. A second form of sampling bias
was due to the fact that the VEP partners and non-partners systematically differ given that
participation in a public voluntary program is optional. More specifically, firms most likely
to benefit from a VEP are thus more likely to sign up as partners. This probably lead to more
progress than would have been possible if a random sample of the country’s companies had
been involved. “Large firms, greener firms, or firms with good management may have been
more likely to participate for a variety of reasons. If these factors are independently related
to outcomes (as they probably would be), the partner sample will be biased” (Boyd &
Manson, 2011).
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Finally, interviewees may have had their own reasons to be interviewed affecting
their willingness to be involved in the study, and the content of their responses. For example,
this project may have been seen by a company as an opportunity for positive press, or as an
opportunity to get in the good graces of the EPA. This also extended to EPA employees who
had the desired to represent their Agency well. These motivations may have lead to an
overstatement of program benefits, thus skewing results (Boyd & Manson, 2011).
Researchers may not know all of the relevant characteristics that can distinguish
between the treatment and comparison groups, however, and even if they could, some key
factors (like a firm’s motivation to innovate, or the presence of a dynamic leader to
implement changes) may be impossible to measure. The effort to develop a complete set of
control variables creates extensive data demands, particularly for a VEP that address more
than one sector (Boyd & Manson, 2011). Future analysis should account for these biases,
especially in a quantitative study.
Despite all of the constraints and potential distortion, it was worth sacrificing the
randomness and pure impartiality of the sample to get as much information as possible from
those groups available. As this was a qualitative investigation, it was most interested in
locating information-rich cases for study in depth, not necessarily in statistically valid yield
(Westat, 2002). Purposeful sampling was practiced instead of a random sample or a stratified
sample of a project’s participants in this evaluation. It focused on the higher tier achievers
admitted to the program, on those participants who had a basis of comparison from having
participated in similar programs, and those from a variety of business sizes.
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Interview Analysis
Qualitative analysis methods were used in this research, so statistical significance and
randomness were not as critical as they would have been in a quantitative study. Considering
the time and resource constraints on the project, this design focused on revealing information
about the successes and weaknesses of the program. In-depth descriptions were the goal, as
opposed to a statistically significant number of totally standardized responses. Interviewees
were given time to reflect and space to elaborate so that unique insights would arise from the
natural train of thought of the interviewee. This organic exploration would likely have been
impossible with shorter more pointed questions requiring responses that were easier to
quantify.
The interview questions examined personal experiences with Climate Leaders, with
the intention of eliciting as much candor from the interviewees as possible. The questions
were designed to define success in the context of voluntary environmental programs, and
probed for perceptions of Climate Leaders—successes and shortcomings—from different
angles. In revealing what was encouraging or frustrating about the program, how each
question was interpreted and what the interviewees emphasized was just as important as the
content of the answer.
Instrumentation
The interview questions were drafted to reflect the literature review, and finalized
according to the guidance of EPA professionals (Laskowski, 2011) who have experience
with voluntary environmental programs at the federal and regional level. The questions were
based on the expected categories in a VEP guiding framework, with an eye to validity and
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reliability. The interviews were implemented with consent from EPA employees and
program participants.
Interview Questions:
1. What was your role in Climate Leaders?
2. To your knowledge, how was the performance of this program tracked during its
existence (According to what metrics and/or what indicators)?
3. According to what specific criterion would you personally have judged the success or
failure of this program (if you were a manager in EPA)?
4. For Climate Leaders, how do you define success?
5. What was your overarching impression of the program: was it a success or a failure
according your experience?
6. What qualities for success do you think this program exemplified, if any?
7. If you had to choose a single attribute, what was the main reason this program was a
success/failure?
8. What specific qualities for success do you think this program lacked, if any? (i.e.
How could this program have been improved?)
9. Do you think others with your role (implementer vs. partner, from a similar
organization) had the same experience with this program?
10. Do you think others in a different role (implementer vs. partner, from a different kind
of organization) had the same experience with this program?
11. Anything else to add?
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CHAPTER THREE
Findings in Literature
History of Environmental Programs in the US
The US EPA was founded in 1970 and issued a Congressional mandate to ensure
compliance with ecologically responsible practices (Darnall, 2005). The agency traditionally
relied on regulatory programs to compel individuals and organizations (Borck, 2009), but
struggled to monitor through inspections and audits against budget cuts and limited funding
allocated by Congress. Critics of the regulatory style argued that this system was inefficient
at achieving environmental improvements. They pointed to media divisions—air, water,
waste, etc.—and the ensuing fragmentation of efforts (Darnall, 2005).
One way to address these concerns was through voluntary environmental programs.
VEPs are collaborative arrangements between firms, regulators, or other third parties in
which firms voluntarily commit to actions that improve the natural environment (Delmas,
2001). The appeal of voluntary environmental programs lies largely in their flexibility, and
in their potential to mutually serve government, industry and environmental interests
(Steelman, 2006). VEPs encourage rather than mandate businesses and other organizations
to adopt environmentally protective measures (Borck, 2009). They rely on a “carrot” instead
of a “stick” approach, spurring commitment to program goals by offering incentive and
market-based initiatives as opposed to regulations. They utilize benefits to reward
intentional and unintentional over-compliance which reduces enforcement needs. This
allows for more holistic approaches with lower administrative costs than would otherwise be
possible (Pizer, 2008).
Unintentional over-compliance has been recorded since the beginning of
environmental regulation. However, in the late 1980’s and into the 1990’s there was a rise of
[15]

companies’ intentional over-compliance with EPA regulations. From the business
perspective, voluntary over-compliance yielded a variety of benefits and is a rational reaction
to environmental regulation (Seema, 1996). For example, there is evidence that this
environmental stewardship was engendered by increasing public awareness of environmental
challenges (Arora, 1995). Companies became greener in an attempt to boost their reputation
with consumers.
This increase in intentional over-compliance was accompanied by a corresponding
rise in voluntary EPA programs (Borck, 2009). It coincided with the administrations of
Presidents Reagan and Bush (41st) who tightened EPA’s belt, and made it even more
important for the Agency to cut costs without sacrificing environmental protection
(Laskowski, 2010). By the late 1990s, Mazurek’s (2002) estimates suggested that more than
13,000 companies were participating in VEPs, and this number has continued to grow
(Darnall, 2005). EPA has since expanded its catalog to over 100 voluntary programs to
buttress its command-and-control regulation and cut expenditures (Borck, 2009).
Environmental Program Evaluation
Not surprisingly, Environmental Program Evaluation is a growing sub-discipline
(Knaap & Kim, 1998); evaluation of voluntary environmental programs is a research niche
within this arena being gradually addressed by academia, particularly public policy and
related fields (Arora, 1995). Since conventional principles and approaches to program
evaluation were developed in a system predominated by command-and-control regulation
(Arora, 1995), these must now be tailored to the newer wave of voluntary environmental
programs. To this end, a selection of studies from the emerging field of voluntary program
research was synthesized. There are two important points to emphasize before delving into
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this existing literature: 1) the aim of this project is to contribute to an evaluative tool, not a
measurement tool, and 2) the research mentions other forms of voluntary agreements in
general, but focuses on the characteristics of voluntary programs specifically.
Evolution of VEPs: Why Some Succeed and Some Do Not
Daley (2007) used a political science lens to observe US public policy shift from a
regulatory to a more “Voluntary Remediation Programs” approach. He analyzed the trend
specifically in relation to the environment. He determined that state policy adoption was a
response to interest group pressure, and had a “ripple effect” on surrounding states. This
sub-national shift affected the business mindset in many formerly polluting/wasteful
industries, which created a more welcoming atmosphere in which EPA could develop
voluntary programs at the federal level (Daley, 2007).
Following a similar ripple effect logic, Arora and Cason (1995) reported that the
characteristics of the target businesses determined participation—and hence the viability—of
a voluntary program. They assessed the ability of a voluntary approach to supplement more
traditional regulatory approaches in these target industries. The researchers used EPA’s
33/50 Program as a case study to distill out the factors correlated with participation in
voluntary programs: technologies, production process, size, 33/50 chemical release, financial
health, etc. Based on formulas, they concluded that voluntary programs like 33/50 were
effective (Arora, 1995). They believed that garnering private sector participation in VEPs by
mirroring a competitive market could lead to significant environmental improvement at a
national level. They recommended that for best results, EPA encourage intra-industry
competition in environmental quality by offering substantial public recognition of
achievement (Arora, 1995).
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Delmas (2010) demonstrated that substantive cooperative strategies are more likely to
be pursued by firms that join a VEP close to its initiation, while symbolic cooperation is
more likely behavior by late joiners. Although VEP early joiners reduced their emissions
more than nonparticipants, the study results show no significant difference overall between
participants and nonparticipants in the reduction of their emissions (Delmas, 2010).
One reason this occured was put forth by King and Lenox (2000) as well as Rivera,
de Leon and Koerber (2006). They indicated that without sanctions, independent oversight,
and standards, VEPs were not effective in promoting improved corporate environmental
performance (Khanna, 1999). This analysis applied to programs like Climate VISION,
Climate Challenge and Climate Leaders, in which the expectations of industry were met
through flexible and cheaper environmental protection requirements, whereas expectations of
the environmentalists and other stakeholders were neglected (Levy, 1997). If VEPs were
used to serve some interests (e.g. businesses) to the exclusion of others (e.g. environment and
community), the authors determined that they were likely to lose their value as potentially
useful regulatory instruments, thereby impoverishing the already limited governing tool box
(Steelman, 2006).
Lyon and Maxwell (2002) also presented an empirical analysis of the efficacy of
voluntary programs. They went a step further, creating a construct to organize the large
variety of voluntary programs and broke them down into three broad types—unilateral,
public, and negotiated— with corresponding examples. They emphasized factors that
determined corporate willingness and ability to undertake voluntary action, and summarized
the downsides to voluntary programs including social welfare-enhancements and social
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welfare reductions, regulation weakening, regulatory monitoring reduction, etc. (Lyon,
2002).
Borck and Coglianese (2009) also described three different structures for VEP’s:
unilateral, bilateral, and public. They reviewed research literature on voluntary
environmental programs to establish whether VEP’s delivered real improvements, or just
took credit for existing public momentum. Their focus was on the ways VEP’s operated,
citing this as the major factor in their success or failure (Borck, 2009). Their research
suggested that “VEP’s with more moderate standards—but with strong enforcement of
them—will have the greatest overall effectiveness.” The authors emphasized participation
and environmental improvement as the two main variables in a simple “effectiveness
equation” (Borck, 2009). By comparing VEP’s to clubs with membership, standards and
side-goals, the researchers extended this metaphor to illuminate some of the advantages (e.g.
collective benefits) and challenges (e.g. defining environmental goals) as well (Borck, 2009).
Delmas and Terlaak (2001) dove deeper into the costs and benefits of voluntary
initiatives when in a competitive context. They described the origins and workings of many
programs in the environmental arena, and provided a construct for sorting such programs
based on these costs and benefits. They compared two main kinds of voluntary
agreements—negotiated agreements and public voluntary programs—with a focus on
organizational design. The authors also investigated programs that had been bundled into
larger comprehensive voluntary initiatives. Finally, they compared US voluntary programs
to those in Europe to extract international best practices (Delmas, 2001).
Darnall (2005) also introduced VEP categories, although his focus on the design
mechanisms rather than the outcome of the program. The author’s findings suggested that
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there are four distinct types of programs with varying degrees of rigor: 1) information,
assistance and awareness, 2) environmental pledge, 3) voluntary reporting, and 4)
performance monitoring programs. The author found that information for differentiating
among program types was limited, which introduced a potentially problematic phenomenon:
less rigorous VEPs could falsely signal that their administrative, environmental performance
and conformance requirements were just as strong as programs with more robust designs.
Moreover, the lack of monitoring and sanctions in less rigorous programs created
opportunities for participants to free-ride and receive benefits without satisfying VEP
requirements. Darnall warned that unless some means of distinguishing among program
types is implemented, these issues could threaten the long term viability of VEPs as a tool for
environmental protection, and the credibility of market mechanisms more broadly (2005).
Segerson and Miceli (1998) presented another model assessing effectiveness of
voluntary schemes, but differentiated it by making it predictive. It was meant to determine if
an initiative was likely to lead to efficient environmental protection before the initiative had
been implemented. This was a very simple model helpful in determining not only the
effectiveness of the voluntary agreement predicted, but also whether a voluntary agreement
was even the likely outcome of a given interaction between a company and a regulating
body. “Polluters” were grouped depending on if they reacted to a “stick” or a “carrot”
alterative program. Results depended on various factors: allocation of bargaining power,
magnitude of background threat, social cost of funding (Segerson, 1998). This model applied
just as well to programs as to other forms of “agreements.”
Pizer, Mogenstern, and Shih (2008) kept a narrow focus, looking at voluntary climate
programs in the US. They investigated the participation of manufacturing firms in EPA’s
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Climate Wise program and the US Department of Energy’s Voluntary Reporting of
greenhouse gas program. The authors analyzed whether the results of either program had a
real environmental impact, for how long, and why. By the metrics used in this study, the
programs had modest—albeit statistically significant—impacts on fuel costs and electricity
costs respectively, and only for a short time. The authors explain, however, that their
methodology was limited by the youth and complexity of the field (Pizer, 2008).
Delmas and Keller (2005) also dove more deeply into a narrow topic: the Free Rider
problem, a potentially major threat to the voluntary programs of interest. They investigated
the WasteWise program to determine what factors (original motivation to enter the voluntary
program, characteristics of the organization, etc.) encouraged or discouraged a particular
behavior (Delmas, 2005).
Economic Considerations: Program Features, Company Finance, Market Conditions
There are three different dimensions on which economic factors weighed into the
performance and results of a voluntary environmental program. The first was on the program
level. Alberini and Segerson (2002) measured voluntary initiatives against traditional
mandatory approaches (regulation or tax), taking into account market effects. They tracked
the evolution of voluntary approaches to environmental protection through an economic lens
by breaking the many voluntary agreements down into three broad categories: industry selfregulation, bilateral agreement, and government program. They laid out conditions for
success in each category, using environmental effectiveness (participation/incentive and
pollution abatement) and relative efficiency (cost and environmental quality) as measures.
They identified voluntary program features key to efficiency: polluter choice, flexibility and
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increased communication between industry and regulator. Conversely, a lack of enforcement
and abatement above the norm were potential disadvantages (Alberini, 2002).
The second level on which economic factors weighed into the success of a VEP was
through company features. Work by Khanna and Damon (1999) attempted to determine
what factors encouraged VEP membership on this level. They concentrated on
characteristics of partner firms, a level that they believed weighed heavily into whether a
business would participate in a program (Khanna, 1999). These characteristics included a
company’s past environmental penalties, predictions about future regulation, leadership
status in an industry’s environmental standard-setting, and calculations of potential
abatement and administrative costs (Futran, 2010). Companies are profit maximizing
institutions, so determining the financial impact of an investment like program partnership
before approving the expenditures is critical to their survival. It was important that firms be
able to design and execute projects with financial benefits, or it would be less likely that the
required investments would be made (Zatz, 1999).
There were several routes by which businesses benefited economically from
participating in VEPs. One was by leveraging the environmental movement to grow
consumer demand. Volunteer environmental programs provided a venue through which
firms could compete to be leaders in environmental quality. Companies that publicized their
efforts to be “greener” earned a reputation for environmental responsibility which is highly
valued today by a public harboring greater awareness of environmental challenges (Videras,
2000). This title was especially valuable in industries that have high advertising expenditures
and high contact with their consumers (Arora, 1996). In fact, as public recognition was
established as a significant incentive for firm participation in EPA programs, the Agency
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began publicly celebrating of achievers to motivate membership in its voluntary
environmental programs. In this way, environmentalism was in line with the ultimate
business goal of maximizing profit (Arora & Cason, 1995). Since consumers were willing to
pay a premium for products and services linked to environmental stewardship, companies got
a demand-side boost as a reward for participation in EPA programs (Arora & Cason, 1996).
This ran contrary to the popular belief that environmental management hurt the bottom line
(Klassen, 1996).
Another way firms reaped the benefits of joining VEPs was through savings. Even
when the immediate impact of program participation was negative due to increased
expenditures, evidence showed that investors expected such firms to be more profitable in the
long run (Khanna, 1999). There was evidence linking strong environmental management to
improved financial performance (as measured by the stock market) through cost cutting and
market gains (Klassen, 1996). Money thrown away on inefficient energy use, water leaks,
missed opportunities for recycling, over-packaging, pollution penalties, etc. could have been
saved by exploiting the guidance of EPA program implementers. Also, market gains came
from improved trading futures, which start with a consumer’s willingness to pay even higher
prices to a firm that generates less environmental harm (Arora & Cason, 1996).
It was clear that environmental stewardship could increase a firm’s profitability
(Klassen, 1996). Logically, it would follow that voluntary environmental programs which
increased demand and decreased costs for participating firms would have greater company
membership, increased longevity, and thus a greater impact on environmental protection than
those that did not. For example, participants in EPA’s 33/50 program calculated a net
economic benefit from involvement, boosting the VEP’s membership and contributing to its
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success (Futran, 2010). These observations lent support to the claim that VEPs are more
likely to succeed if they offered net savings as opposed to net loss for participant
organizations. The bottom line is extremely important when deciding whether to get
involved with EPA programs, but this is not a straightforward calculation. Many companies
determine their success with a longer term measure than a quarterly or yearly statement. To
do so, they keep an eye on public opinion and stock markets. They participate in voluntary
environmental programs because they realize that their investments in a VEP are covered by
an eventual payback, and their company’s value and net profit are enhanced over time.
Much more extensive literature is required to prove the actual impact of a partner’s economic
costs and savings in the success of federal voluntary environmental programs. An important
variable that must be controlled is the larger economic context: whether the country or the
industry is in a boom or a recession. The significance of this variable is yet unknown, and
with future research it may change the entire equation.
The third way that economic factors affected VEP performance was on the market
level. Boyd’s (2011) work took this perspective, looking beyond individual company
features to assess VEPs within the context of the larger economic environment. He asserted
that the most fertile ground for new voluntary environmental programs would be laid by
market failure—a situation in which regular market forces are not producing efficient
environmental outcomes. According to Boyd, greenhouse gas emissions represented such an
opportunity: the environmental costs of carbon emissions were being externalized. The
market was not setting greenhouse gas limits despite the health and long-term economic
harm. A government program free of membership charges like Climate Leaders addressed
this disparity. It was the equivalent of subsidizing the information, resources, tools, or
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guidance for participating firms, large and small. Large firms found it easier to “diffuse the
fruits of technical assistance within their organizations (e.g., to multiple manufacturing
facilities)” (Boyd & Manson, 2011). This implied that a given technical assistance
intervention could yield large social benefits when applied to larger firms. Small firms, in
contrast could arguably innovate aggressively with no need for government intervention or
VEP assistance. However, they were found particularly susceptible to “research and
development” market failures making it difficult for them to create, protect, and enjoy the
benefits of new intellectual property (Boyd, 2011). VEPs could provide small firms with this
security. Boyd grouped successful VEPs into two categories based on these parameters: 1)
“programs that provide technical assistance and rectify the failure to invest in research,
development, and technological innovation,” and 2) “programs that provide signaling
features which address information imbalances associated with complex products and
processes, specifically incomplete information that can result in decisions that lead to
negative environmental impacts.” He warned against environmental programs that promote
behavior which would have occurred anyhow, as a result of existing market conditions.
Boyd’s claim that government programs should address market failures also applied
to government evaluations of such programs. Government interventions, whether EPA
program implementation or the evaluations that follow, were found more difficult to justify if
there were no underlying conditions that would normally be considered market failure.
Program evaluations are not easy to appropriate for profit, so they were not incentivized by
the market (Boyd, 2011). Boyd found environmental programs and evaluations needed,
especially those sponsored by academia and government, when markets failed to produce
them. They provided information for communicating to a variety of stakeholders, and gave
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managers the data they need to report to decision makers about the outcomes of their
investments (Westat, 2002). This idea of reporting on the outcomes of federal investments
has grown in prominence over the last several years, in large part due to the establishment of
the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). The GPRA requires federal agencies
to report on the accomplishments of their funded efforts annually, including establishing
broad goals or strategic outcomes, performance outcomes, and performance indicators
against which progress will be assessed (Westat, 2002). The evaluation of Climate Leaders
undertaken in this project provided information that the market had failed to supply, and
facilitated accounting of EPA’s effort in the program.
This literature review of environmental program evaluation, specifically regarding the
evolution of environmental voluntary programs, provided many important insights into what
makes VEPs successful. It provided a context against which to analyze the Climate Leaders
program, a step that will contribute to a guiding framework for VEPs. This tool will improve
the overall performance of VEPs by taking in the many lessons learned from work in the past
and yielding a comprehensive guide. This will boost the effectiveness and efficiency of
VEPs, and help environmental organizations and agencies avoid repeating serious mistakes
like prematurely aborted programs and wasted resources. The evaluation of Climate Leaders
was a building block for this guiding framework.
Climate Leaders Program Background
Climate Leaders was an EPA voluntary program that worked with companies to
develop long-term comprehensive climate change strategies (Design Principles, 2005). It
was started in 2002 to get companies’ carbon management off the ground, offering an early
standard for tracking and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. (See Appendix B,
Quote B). To fulfill their program commitment, partners had to complete a GHG inventory,
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set a reduction goal and meet that goal (McCarthy, 2010). To do so, EPA guided them in
setting corporate-wide GHG reduction targets, planning emissions reductions projects, and
gathering emissions inventories to measure progress.
The Climate Leaders’ “Greenhouse Gas Inventory Protocol” was based on an existing
corporate greenhouse gas inventory protocol developed by the World Resources Institute and
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. Through collaboration between
industry, government, and non-governmental organizations, the World Resources Institute
and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development produced widely accepted
accounting practices for measuring and reporting corporate greenhouse gas emissions. Their
“GHG Protocol” Corporate Standard consisted of a corporate accounting and reporting
standard and calculation tools (EPA Design Principles, 2005).
According to EPA implementers, the success of Climate Leaders relied on highly
engaged partners moving through program at good speed, submitting data in timely fashion
(Anonymous #1, 2011). EPA tracked the program’s process by the number of 1) partners
signed up, 2) inventories submitted, and 3) goals approved by EPA (Anonymous #2, 2011).
By reporting inventory data to EPA, partners created a lasting record of their
accomplishments and identified themselves as corporate environmental leaders. Climate
Leaders could also help strategically position partners for unfolding climate change policy
(EPA Design Principles, 2005). The hope was that this program would allow partners to
broaden their emissions reduction plan and align their priorities in other areas to be more
environmentally responsible (Anonymous #1, 2011).
Climate Leader partners committed to (EPA Design Principles, 2005):
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Developing a corporate-wide GHG inventory of all sources of the six major
gases (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6) using the Climate Leaders GHG
Inventory Protocol
Setting an aggressive corporate-wide GHG emissions reduction goal to be
achieved in the subsequent 5-10 years
Developing a corporate GHG inventory management plan
Annually report inventory data and document progress towards their reduction
goal
Publicize their participation, reduction pledge, and accomplishments achieved
through the program

In return, EPA provided (EPA Design Principles, 2005):






Recognition
 Press events
 Articles and public service announcements in business and trade
publications
 Speaking engagements at industry conferences
 Case studies highlighting Partner achievements
Technical Assistance
 Developing a GHG inventory
 Reviewing inventory management plan
 Setting a GHG reduction goal
 Exchanging with peers through Climate Leaders Partner meetings
Credibility
 A credible, transparent GHG reporting mechanism that will develop with
the science
 Assurance that Partners have created a high-quality GHG management
process
Climate Leaders Termination Letter

In September of 2010, EPA announced that it would “phase down services the agency
offers under its Climate Leaders program over the coming year and encourage participating
companies to transition to state or non-governmental programs” (McCarthy, 2010).
According to the termination letter sent to partners, the transition would “allow the agency to
realign resources to better assist companies in learning from the emissions data collected
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under the GHG Reporting Program” (McCarthy, 2010). In other words, EPA terminated the
program because it wanted to put its time and money elsewhere.
The letter said that among EPA’S reasons for this decision were that other new
regulatory and voluntary programs existed that address greenhouse gas emissions. These
include EPA’s Green Power Partnership, ENERGY STAR, and other members of its climate
Protection Partnership. Finally, the letter pointed to the multiple states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) offering climate programs that EPA claimed were now
robust enough to serve companies’ greenhouse gas management needs. For example, many
large firms were already members of the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and The Climate
Registry (TCR), two alternative voluntary greenhouse gas reduction programs. What percent
of former Climate Change partners will continue GHG reduction activities is yet to be seen.
EPA promised to look for new ways to promote, support and recognize climate leadership. It
even noted the US’s first mandatory greenhouse gas reporting rule that took effect on January
1, 2010 as evidence of the importance of GHG reduction to the Agency (EPA Press Release,
2010).
According to interviewees in this study, the decision to end Climate Leaders was
made without input from those at EPA actually managing the day-to-day activities of the
program. Climate Leaders staff was reassigned to other programs that did not necessarily
deal directly with greenhouse gas emissions (Anonymous #2). Since the program team was
the bridge to partners, this meant no word was passed on to companies participating in the
program until September 2010 when they received the termination letter. That was just one
month before the annual meeting. Former partners were so surprised and outraged at the

[29]

untimely notification that they attested to keeping their plane tickets to the meeting just so
they could “yell at EPA in person.”
Why Was Climate Leaders Canceled and What Were the Effects
The end of Climate Leaders was met with frustration and confusion by many
corporate partners that had invested in meeting program requirements. (See Appendix B,
Quote D). EPA gave one explanation for its decision to end the program: a desire to reallocate resources where they were more needed and could be more efficiently used. What
went unspoken were the reasons for the underlying change in perspective and shift in
priorities. From interviews, several insights came to light about the consequences of a
leadership change at the top, and many ways in which the program termination could have
been handled better.
Several anonymous sources reported their impression that with the change from
Bush’s administration to Obama’s, there was a new emphasis on environmentalism and
reinvigoration of EPA. Climate Leaders had been considered by some as too industry
friendly, and they demanded a more equally beneficial symbiosis between the public and
private sector (Dunn, 2011). To the new administration, addressing this complaint meant
empowering EPA to use the “stick” of regulation instead of the “carrot” of voluntary
programs. The subsequent dismantling of federal environmental voluntary programs was
interpreted by many companies as a desire by the new administration to show a new
“tougher” stance on environmental issues. Unfortunately, turning to a more traditional
regulatory approach also meant sacrificing the many benefits of VEPs. These ranged from
lower administrative costs than regulatory alternatives, to stronger relationships (and
knowledge sharing) between industry and government. According to some interviewees,
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Climate Leaders was much better than regulation at gather information about GHG emissions
on behalf of government and industry, and with the right amount of effort. These former
partners claimed that the new regulation will be more focused on catching offenders than
working with companies to improve their practices. This shift will be difficult for large
companies as they can be cumbersome and have trouble adjusting to the new rules. It will
also be difficult for small companies since they have limited resources to help them adapt to
such changes.
This study yielded several ways that program termination process could have been
improved to ease this transition. One was by earlier and clearer communication to partners
about decisions that would directly affect the private sector. A second was even more
fundamental: incorporating an “exit strategy,” or planned ending, into program design from
the beginning. Climate Leaders was developed by EPA, an agency that mostly focuses on a
regulatory approach that is usually long term. VEPs like Climate Leaders, however, are
public-private partnerships; something altogether different from traditional mandatory rules
and enforcement methods. Instead, VEPs are approached more like business ventures. In the
business world, such undertakings would have a startup phase, a money-making phase, and
then an exit strategy. EPA would do well to follow this model for VEPs. They should plan
for an initial design and “gear up” phase, a performance metric-gathering phase, and an exit
strategy (Dunn, 2011). This would give program implementers EPA the time and ability to
adequately prepare for the end, and to help partners do the same.
Existing Lessons from EPA VEPs
EPA experience with other VEPs yielded valuable lessons which the Agency applied
to Climate Leaders with varying degrees of success. First, EPA learned how important it was
to protect and elevate its programs’ “brand name.” If a VEP is backed up by rigorous and
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successful environmental stewardship, the public will have positive associations with the
program’s name. Company membership in that program will then carry more value,
increasing participation. (See Appendix B, Quote A). One example of successful branding
is ENERGY STAR, arguably EPA’s most successful VEP. ENERGY STAR encourages
energy efficient buildings and products by offering partners (participants) a label for
performance. The program has developed a reputation for results among consumers, so
membership became highly coveted by industry. Over time, it evolved an intricate hierarchy
of merits that culminates in a yearly ENERGY STAR Awards night. Today, the ENERGY
STAR label is recognized by 84% of Americans according to EPA statistics, and is a symbol
for financial savings through energy efficiency. In the case of Climate Leaders, companies
that wanted to turn a new “green leaf” for the benefit of the environment or to impress
consumers were able to associate with EPA through their membership. Former partners
reported that learning how to be a greener company in their manufacturing operations helped
secure them more contracts and make their employees happier. They felt this offered them a
leg above their competition (Anonymous #2, 2011). Climate Leaders did celebrate partner
achievements and provided public recognition, which helped establish its brand power.
However, it was not as successful as ENERGY STAR at marketing itself as a premium
“brand name” program.
The brand name idea was leveraged even less by EPA’s Performance Track. This
flagship VEP encouraged general environmental stewardship, lumping together high and
low-achieving participants. Unfortunately, this lack of merit distinction degraded the value
of membership in the program and in 2010, the program was ultimately terminated.
Performance Track did get many things right, like relying heavily on Regional-level
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involvement. This is the second lesson that EPA should have learned and applied; Climate
Leaders would have done well to branch out of headquarters in this way. Unfortunately, its
staff was small and centralized at EPA headquarters with minimal outreach to Regional
offices (Jones, 2011). Still, with only 4 full-time staff members handling Climate Leaders
implementation at any given time, it was a remarkably effective and well-regarded initiative
until it was ended in 2010 (Anonymous #2, 2011).
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CHAPTER FOUR
Discussion of Study
Format
The primary research in this study was a “process” and “outcome” evaluation of
EPA’s Climate Leaders Program. (See Appendix A, Table 2 for Overview of the Evaluation
Process). Progress and impact of the VEP were analyzed through a literature review and
interviews. Recording and presenting results in a qualitative form allowed for richer
descriptions about program activities, context, participant behaviors, and stakeholder
experiences than would have a quantitative approach (Bond, 1997). The information
harvested was in a format that was geared towards policy makers and program implementers,
to help them inform ongoing and future EPA programs. It was analyzed and sorted into
recommendations meant to help standardize program expectations and design for a more
holistic approach to environmental stewardship on a national—someday international—scale.
Objectives
To contribute to the field of environmental program evaluations, the
recommendations emanating from this study are meant to do two things. First and foremost,
the recommendations advance a comprehensive guiding framework for VEPs that will
require combining the efforts of program evaluators from many disciplines, assessing all
stages of program lifecycle. Today’s program evaluation measures the success of a program,
communicates its strengths and advantages, identifies potential improvements, and ideally
redirects resources to ensure effective use (Pumphry, 1993). It can facilitate program
management by helping identify particularly successful aspects of projects and programs, so
managers can choose to divert resources to these more productive activities (Bond, 1997).
Evaluation may also identify external or exogenous factors that hinder program success. The
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guiding framework being advanced by this study will go a step further than the traditional
program evaluations. It will assist environmental organizations and agencies in creating
more efficient and effective VEPs, and thus avoiding premature cancellation of voluntary
programs and squandering of resources. On a larger scale, however, it will actually help
enhance existing programs by identifying redundancies, fill in gaps, and increase the overall
efficiency of agencies that will no longer be forced to evaluate their programs only
retrospectively. Due to its collaborative nature, the finished guiding framework will have
been be vetted by all stakeholders including industry, government, and environmentalists to
add legitimacy. It will model all of the key features common to successful VEPs from
inception to completion, and will serve as a foundation, manual and modifiable blueprint.
The framework will ultimately contribute to a more holistic approach to VEPs by which
agencies and organizations can improve design and process proactively. Such progress will
move the entire field of environmental program evaluations forward into a new era.
Second, this study sheds light on the shortcomings of VEPs like Climate Leaders, and
help ensure that those under construction are built more soundly. While observations were
based on a single program, recommendations may also apply to other voluntary program
“bundles” (like the Sustainability Partnership in Region 3) and similar voluntary schemes in
other regions.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Recommendations
Results of Climate Leaders Evaluation
The standardized interview used in this project was meant to determine whether an
interviewee felt that Climate Leaders was successful overall, and why or why not. The
questions were intended to draw out specific characteristics of a VEP that contributed to this
impression, but the open-ended design of the questions allowed space for elaboration into
unplanned areas of insight. The information from this analysis was originally expected to
yield very specific information about the structure of a successful VEP:







ideal size (number of participant entities from the public)
scope (types of organizations participating)
assistance/support system (provided to participants)
time-line (of program overall, and for benchmark goals throughout)
management style (used by EPA’s implementation staff)
incentive structure (for participant involvement).

However, the research and interviews did not produce such specific targeted answers. This is
because traits like ideal scope and size depend upon the program’s unique environmental
arena and targets therein. It turned out that VEP structures varied depending on whether they
are tackling environmental challenges of local, regional, national or even global scale.
Instead, the interviews in this project yielded more basic information about the core qualities
of a successful program. (See Appendix C, Chart 4 for Climate Leaders Evaluation Results).
These design, process, and implementation results revealed lessons and warnings for
ongoing and future programs. Answers to research questions numbers one through three
focus on Climate Leaders and other similar ongoing VEPs. These are more likely to have
narrow applicability: federal VEPs addressing one specific environmental problem. The other
answers (to questions three through seven below) contain recommendations that will be
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helpful more broadly: to any organization running VEPs, with no specific scope and size. By
comparing and contrasting the responses of partners and implementers, many common trends
and sentiments were observed as well as a handful of differences. When compiled, they
answered the main research questions posed in Chapter 1:
1. How do you define success for the Climate Leaders program?
Success for Climate Leaders was defined by its ability to satisfy both industry
(partners) and government/environmentalists (EPA). From the perspective of the private
sector, VEPs are considered successful if they offer the company net savings as opposed
to net loss for participant organizations (Futran, 2010). For EPA, success means using
taxpayers’ money efficiently to protect the environment and human health. This
ultimately requires achieving a deep enough bend in the greenhouse gas emissions
trajectory to make a positive impact on climate change.
2. In what ways did Climate Leaders succeed?
From the partners’ perspective, Climate Leaders was successful because they received:





free technical assistant
easy-to-use tools and structure to inventory GHG, set goals, and reach them
standardized protocol for calculating/managing GHG
simplified federal rules surrounding GHG emissions (and preparation for pending
regulation)
 a relationship with EPA
 significant knowledge-sharing among partners
 instant credibility associated with EPA programs, which made the VEP a better
value proposition in making the case for involvement to higher management
 benefits to most partner companies’ bottom lines
 public recognition for achievements
 relatively short-term payback (financial and/or reputational) on investments
From EPA’s perspective, the success of Climate Leaders was reached because it:



did a lot on a small budget (high level program with small staff)
helped make climate change an issue that the business world understood and
addressed
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high number of engaged participants representing a significant portion of US
GHG emissions
helped ensure emission reduction measures were reported accurately
set program goals high enough to merit public respect, but achievable enough for
companies to agree to public disclosure and inventory preparation
encouraged ambitious partner goals and high partner investment in abatement
efforts
allowed EPA to engage climate change at some level of during an administration
that was reticent to regulate industry
contributed to significant GHG emissions reduction on a national scale

3. How could Climate Leaders have been improved?









Progressively higher membership standards so that the program maintains
credibility, and recognition is more meaningful
o Moving from normalized goals to absolute goals sooner
o Differentiation between high and low participant achievements
A greater line of communication open for partner feedback
o Meeting more often to bolster the government/industry relations
o Faster response time from consultants
Better outreach to recalcitrant companies
More value added for complex manufacturing firms (as opposed to catering more
to commercial firms)
Greater EPA headquarter outreach to EPA regional offices
More dynamic annual analysis to determine what collected metrics say about
program progress and results
Plan for the entire life of program mapped out up front and shared with partners,
including milestones, ending, and replacement initiatives

4. What circumstantial conditions (e.g. political, economic) are important to the
success/failure of VEPs?






Evidence of a major/urgent environmental problem needing to be addressed (e.g.
climate change)
Likelihood of pending environmental regulation
o VEP that addresses anticipated requirements
o Relationship of VEP to agency creating pending regulation
Administrators that support voluntary approaches
o Sufficient federal funding for environmental initiatives
o Sufficient staff dedicated to the VEP
A market receptive to green companies, including both consumers and executives
Unexpected termination by higher management
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5. What inbuilt features (e.g. structural, procedural) are important to the success/failure
of VEPs?









Strong leadership
o Credibility of organization or agency implementing
o Well-trained implementation staff
Soundly structured program
o Well-known “gold standard” protocol as foundation for program (e.g.
GHG protocol in Climate Leaders)
o Sufficient resources (staff, funds, expertise, time, etc.)
Large/growing membership of participants representing major portion of problem
(emission, pollution, etc.)
Commitment to significant environmental goals
Progress in meeting goals
o Partner cooperation and knowledge sharing
Public recognition and promotions
Clearly articulated expectations
o Evolution of goals to continue pushing progress
o Exit strategy

6. What lessons learned from Climate Leaders can be applied to ongoing EPA VEPs at a
federal and regional level?
It is critical to collect data throughout the life of the program, and judge progress
based on multiple criteria. These should focus on showing how EPA is managing its
resources, and also whether partners are showing a return on investments (Dunn, 2011).
Data should also be analyzed for unexpected outcomes. “Interaction effects” can
yield unwanted results, as was the case when EPA’s ENERGY STAR began labeling
energy efficient refrigerators: instead of reducing use, the VEP ended up increasing
demand as consumers began purchasing new refrigerators without getting rid of their old
ones. The effect was to unexpectedly increase overall national energy use instead of
reducing consumption (Gillingham, 2006). In the case of Climate Leaders, the economic
concern is that energy savings from cut emissions might result in a reallocation of
expenditures in another area. Such unintended results can weaken the environmental
contributions of an otherwise strong program.
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Climate Leaders was least successful in one key area: program termination. The
VEP’s end was not pre-designed or well-managed by implementers. It was terminated
from the top down, without adequate notice and input for implementers and safety nets
for participants. As a result, partners viewed the termination as premature, unexpected,
and in some cases infuriating. This affects confidence in EPA and VEPs in general,
which could damage similar efforts in the future. (See Appendix B, Quote C).
7. What improvements are not accounted for in existing frameworks that must be added
for comprehensibility in evaluating program performance?
There has been a rise in evaluations that are part of a program from the beginning
called formative evaluations. These are not separate from a project or simply amended to
it as an afterthought, but are integrated throughout. In the past, evaluations were often
used to measure performance based only on information gathered in a final, summative
act. Such retrospective evaluations were too late to improve the program being
evaluated. In formative assessments, planning, evaluation, and implementation are all
parts of a whole working together concert. Research has shown that by interacting, they
yield the highest quality programs (Westat, 2002). (See Appendix A, Table 3 for
example of formative Project Development and Evaluation Cycle).
In an ideal VEP, data analysis is built into the design periodically to examine absolute
trends, and compare these to hypothetical scenarios in which the program had not existed.
This data analysis would help program implementers establish sector benchmarks based
on their unique characteristics. The individualized point of reference would set a
foundation from which to negotiate program goals with each partner company. Such a
data analysis and benchmarking process is already underway by industry, as described by
Tonkonogy (2007).
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Finally, two tests should be included in the framework to test VEPs during the design
and implementation stages. First, a “Procedural Test” is needed to ensure inclusive and
responsible participation in a VEP. Programs should include industry, government and
environmental groups to build accountability for the actions suggested and taken.
Second, a “Substantive Test” is needed to guarantee validity and appropriateness of
concerns raised by participants (Steelman, 2006).

Key Lesson
There was one lesson for organizations and agencies running VEPs that stood out
among the rest: the need for a combination of regulatory and voluntary approaches. In many
cases, the discussion about federal environmental strategy has become a battle pitting the two
approaches against each other. This argument is addressing a false question. Research
shows that neither management style is superior, but rather that each is weakened without the
existence of the other (Bennear, 2007). In other words, both regulatory and voluntary
strategies play a necessary role in effective environmental protection on a national level.
On one hand, voluntary programs are less effective without the backdrop of
mandatory regulation than when launched alongside harder laws (Khanna, 1999). That is
because mandatory regulation—even pending regulation—increases the incentive for
companies to participate in voluntary initiatives. Khanna and Damon (1999) explained that
“participation in voluntary programs depends to a large extent on the existence of a
regulatory framework that would impose penalties on firms that do not undertake proactive
measures for self-regulation.” Over a decade later, Delmas (2010) came to the same
conclusion, citing the difficulty involved in using voluntary schemes to induce improved
environmental outcomes where no sanctioning mechanisms exist.
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On the other hand, voluntary programs offer the tools companies need to meet
evolving laws and rules. Climate Leaders is a perfect example, offering free help for
companies to get their emissions under control and avoid regulatory penalties. EPA would
benefit from a balance of the voluntary “carrot” and regulatory “stick” approaches, rather
than sacrificing one for the other. Instead of debating which policy instrument is better,
efforts should be put towards finding the most effective and efficient combination of VEPs
and regulation. Together however, they provide a proper balance of strength and flexibility.
Limitations
In this project, EPA’s Climate Leader program was evaluated as a case study.
Voluntary environmental programs literature was reviewed, evaluation theory was
synthesized, and lessons were gathered for incorporation into a guiding framework for VEPs.
The evaluation was used to filter out success standards for Climate Leaders specifically, and
to contribute to a guiding framework for VEPs at large. This process was not without
challenges, however.
This analysis focused mostly on one program, Climate Leaders, so the results were
not necessarily definitive, comprehensive, nor generalizable to programs of different
characteristics (size, scope, aim, region, etc.). The evaluation selectively incorporated
attributes of Environmental Program Evaluation deemed most fitting to Climate Leaders,
which may have limited the applicability of the resulting recommendations; they are most
relevant to American VEPs with origins at the national level. Additional research is needed
to confirm whether the trends are reliable, and whether they apply more widely.
It is important to mention other limitations inherent in these research methods. One
that could not be overcome was that the limited literature on how to best design, implement,
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and evaluate a VEP was very diverse across several dimensions. First, the surveyed literature
organizes program categories across breakdowns of different characteristics, and does so to
varying degrees of granulation. Second, studies attribute success or failure of a program to
unique factors, including characteristics of target participants, operations of program, or
incentives offered by the program. They also group those factors across varying dimensions.
Third, regional level programs may be different from national programs in their partnership
base or employee performance. It was impossible to reconcile these different evaluation
strategies and variables perfectly, so at times a judgment call is made when deciding which to
include.
Finally, even once all of the necessary information to build a comprehensive guiding
framework for VEPs is compiled, the framework itself will be a challenge to draw up. This
is because of the nature of program diversity; a tool to guide VEP design and implementation
must be broad enough to encompass the many kinds in existence, but specific enough to
capture the qualities that make them each distinct. Standardizing VEPs in the future will
make it possible to label programs to distinguish among the different types (Darnall, 2005).
Future Research
Future work in this area should collect similar data on other voluntary environmental
programs from EPA’s headquarters and regional offices, as well as other agencies (e.g. the
Department of Energy) and organizations (e.g. the World Resources Institute). Programs that
were terminated would make informative case studies by providing lessons learned, while
successful ongoing programs (or those terminated on schedule) would contribute best
practices. The more program evaluation results compiled, the more robust the guiding
framework for VEPs can become. At EPA, data collection should be standardized and
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analyzed across programs to be consistent and provide office and agency-wide information
about program organization, size, and achievements (Boyd & Manson, 2011). EPA offices
should develop standardized demand measures that begin with the following (Boyd &
Manson, 2011):





participation rates (number of partners);
duration and consistency of participation (retention of partners);
public voluntary program resource usage rates (hotline calls, conference
participation, and guidance downloads and requests); and
Evidence of repeat demand

Climate Leaders was part of EPA’s Region 3 office “bundle” called the Sustainability
Partnership, so once a guiding framework for VEPs is relatively robust, future research
should test it for applicability to “bundled” voluntary programs: initiatives which offer
guidance and access to multiple VEPs addressing different environmental issues all at one
source. In addition to Region 3’s Sustainability Partnership, these might include Region 7’s
(Kansas City) 2010 partnership bundles, and Region 2’s (New York City) Green Team.
Eventually this research can be expanded internationally to test and tweak the limits of the
framework’s applicability.
Conclusion
A comprehensive guiding framework for voluntary environmental programs will
serve to arm agencies like EPA against blotched programs and squandered resources. It will
allow future voluntary environmental programs to be designed with consistency, executed
according to industry-vetted practices, and terminated responsibly. When enough—
eventually all—VEPs are assessed at every stage, they will be at peak effectiveness.
However, to reach this point, the guiding framework for VEPs must be rounded out by
additional evaluations. This study provided one such evaluation of the Climate Leaders
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program, and recommendations for its improvement. Similar evaluations and perspectives
from other fields of social science will help create a robust and inclusive tool. Once
complete, the guiding framework will help fine-tune VEPs according to standards vetted
through evaluations, insuring they are designed with the highest likelihood of success. This
will be a major challenge to academia, but will be a worthwhile endeavor. Such efficiency
and effectiveness is vital in addressing issues that can be critically time-sensitive including
air and water pollution, biodiversity decline, climate change, water quality and allocation,
resource and waste management, and energy efficiency.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A

Table 1: Summary of Data Collection Methods

Research Question
How do you define success for the Climate Leaders program?
In what ways did Climate Leaders succeed?
How could Climate Leaders have been improved?
What circumstantial conditions (e.g. economical, political) are important to
the success/failure of VEPs?
What inbuilt features are important to the success/failure of VEPs? (e.g.
structurally/procedurally)?
What lessons learned from Climate Leaders can be applied to ongoing
EPA VEPs on a federal and regional level?
What improvements are not accounted for in existing frameworks that
must be added for comprehensibility in evaluating program performance?

Table 2: Overview of the Evaluation Process

(Bond, 1997)
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Data Collection
Methods
Literature
Review

Interview

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

Table 3: Project Development/Evaluation Cycle

(Westat, 2002)
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Appendix B

Sample Quotes by Interviewees
A. “EPA’s blessing gave a program like Climate Leaders the status of a ‘name-brand.’ EPA
didn’t realize value attributed by companies to EPA’s processes— inventories, numbers
and goals. In some cases, that name-brand was premier benefit.”
–Former Climate Leaders partner company representative
B. “EPA programs are held to the highest standard because they force participants to actually
work for their partnership credentials. Currently, there are too many different
organizations and non-profits pulling companies in so many directions. It would be nice if
Climate Leaders provided the undisputed structure and calculations to address greenhouse
gas emissions so we could focus our efforts. If EPA was the leadership standard, that
would be success. Climate Leaders was an absolute success until it was terminated.”
–Former Climate Leaders partner company representative
C. “I’ve heard a lot of people say, especially around October ‘funeral meeting,’ that this is
last time they will sign up for an EPA program. These were people who had invested
personal credibility, telling their company to get involved despite the work it would take.
They had a stake in the program when, all of the sudden, EPA cut their legs out. They
ended up thinking to themselves, ‘Fool me once. I’m not signing up for one of these
things again.” There was more damage done in this way—the way the program ending
was handled—than EPA may have realized.”
–Former Climate Leaders partner company representative
D. “I don’t think EPA saw how highly valued certain aspects of Climate Leaders were. This
should be cautionary tale for EPA: don’t start a program if you are not prepared to
articulate that is a ‘sun-setting’ initiative with specific objectives that will come to an end,
or have a plan to keep a program alive to ensure whoever signs up and helps make it
successful doesn’t feel abandoned.”
–Former Climate Leaders partner company representative
E. “I saw work of Climate Leaders not as focus on game changing so much, but on
systematic process of getting companies to be aware of their emissions and institute highly
integrated plans to slowly and surely reduce them over time. It was an ‘evolutionary’ versus
‘revolutionary’ type of program.”
–Former EPA Climate Leaders promoter
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Appendix C

Chart 1: Three-Pronged Approach to Program Evaluation

Program
Documents
Evaluation
Theory

Interviews

Evaluation

Chart 2: Three Steps to Climate Leaders Evaluation

Literature
Review

•Voluntary Program theory
•Program Evaluation
Frameworks
•Climate Leaders Documents

Interviews

Analysis
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•EPA Implementors
•Partner Company
Participants

•Successes
•Failures
•Potential Improvements

Chart 3: Formal Interviews Breakdown

Chart 4: Climate Leaders Evaluation Results
Program Strengths
Well organized: clear expectations and instructions
Aggressive goals and rigorous requirements
Committed and skilled staff
Free data help, standardized tools, and framework
Free technical expertise
Public recognition of partner success
High standard for membership
High partner traction/numbers
Strong partner commitment/engagement
Industry sharing outside of competitive arena
Feeling of cooperation/“family” among partners
Gave GHG management in business more value
Partners more prepared for GHG regulation
National-scale emissions awareness and reduction
Showed how much VEPs could accomplish
Work was transparent and robust

Program Weaknesses
Lacked predetermined termination date
Allowed excessive flexibility and lag-time on early goals
Consultants not intimately familiar with industries
No external auditing services offered, only EPA audits
Assistance too individualized and inefficient overall
More differentiation among partner achievements
Goals did not evolve in stride with growing program
Partners were mostly self-selected high achievers
Goal-setting minimums not raised high enough
No replacement program to ensure efforts continued
Insufficient number of meetings and conference calls
Unsustainable pace/expansion and understaffed
Ended before US GHG regulation went into effect
Sudden end undermined individual/company investment
Method and timing of termination reduced faith in VEPs
Analysis/utilization of data/results insufficient
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